COVID-19 Among Workers in the Seafood Processing Industry: Implications for Prevention Measures - Alaska, March-October 2020.

Large COVID-19 outbreaks have occurred in high-density workplaces, such as food processing facilities (1). Alaska's seafood processing industry attracts approximately 18,000 out-of-state workers annually (2). Many of the state's seafood processing facilities are located in remote areas with limited health care capacity. On March 23, 2020, the governor of Alaska issued a COVID-19 health mandate (HM10) to address health concerns related to the impending influx of workers amid the COVID-19 pandemic (3). HM10 required employers bringing critical infrastructure (essential) workers into Alaska to submit a Community Workforce Protective Plan.* On May 15, 2020, Appendix 1 was added to the mandate, which outlined specific requirements for seafood processors, to reduce the risk for transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, in these high-density workplaces (4). These requirements included measures to prevent introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into the workplace, including testing of incoming workers and a 14-day entry quarantine before workers could enter nonquarantine residences. After 13 COVID-19 outbreaks in Alaska seafood processing facilities and on processing vessels during summer and early fall 2020, State of Alaska personnel and CDC field assignees reviewed the state's seafood processing-associated cases. Requirements were amended in November 2020 to address gaps in COVID-19 prevention. These revised requirements included restricting quarantine groups to ≤10 persons, pretransfer testing, and serial testing (5). Vaccination of this essential workforce is important (6); until high vaccination coverage rates are achieved, other mitigation strategies are needed in this high-risk setting. Updating industry guidance will be important as more information becomes available.

Modeling transmission dynamics and effectiveness of worker screening programs for SARS-CoV-2 in pork processing plants.

Pork processing plants were apparent hotspots for SARS-CoV2 in the spring of 2020. As a result, the swine industry was confronted with a major occupational health, financial, and animal welfare crisis. The objective of this work was to describe the epidemiological situation within processing plants, develop mathematical models to simulate transmission in these plants, and test the effectiveness of routine PCR screening at minimizing SARS-CoV2 circulation. Cumulative incidence of clinical (PCR-confirmed) disease plateaued at ~2.5% to 25% across the three plants studied here. For larger outbreaks, antibody prevalence was approximately 30% to 40%. Secondly, we developed a mathematical model that accounts for asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, and background "community" transmission. By calibrating this model to observed epidemiological data, we estimated the initial reproduction number (R) of the virus. Across plants, R generally ranged between 2 and 4 during the initial phase, but subsequently declined to ~1 after two to three weeks, most likely as a result of implementation/compliance with biosecurity measures in combination with population immunity. Using the calibrated model to simulate a range of possible scenarios, we show that the effectiveness of routine PCR-screening at minimizing disease spread was far more influenced by testing frequency than by delays in results, R, or background community transmission rates. Testing every three days generally averted about 25% to 40% of clinical cases across a range of assumptions, while testing every 14 days typically averted 7 to 13% of clinical cases. However, the absolute number of additional clinical cases expected and averted was influenced by whether there was residual immunity from a previous peak (i.e., routine testing is implemented after the workforce had experienced an initial outbreak). In contrast, when using PCR-screening to prevent outbreaks or in the early stages of an outbreak, even frequent testing may not prevent a large outbreak within the workforce. This research helps to identify protocols that minimize risk to occupational safety and health and support continuity of business for U.S. processing plants. While the model was calibrated to meat processing plants, the structure of the model and insights about testing are generalizable to other settings where large number of people work in close proximity.

The Potential of Selected Agri-Food Loss and Waste to Contribute to a Circular Economy: Applications in the Food, Cosmetic and Pharmaceutical Industries.

The food sector includes several large industries such as canned food, pasta, flour, frozen products, and beverages. Those industries transform agricultural raw materials into added-value products. The fruit and vegetable industry is the largest and fastest-growing segment of the world agricultural production market, which commercialize various products such as juices, jams, and dehydrated products, followed by the cereal industry products such as chocolate, beer, and vegetable oils are produced. Similarly, the root and tuber industry produces flours and starches essential for the daily diet due to their high carbohydrate content. However, the processing of these foods generates a large amount of waste several times improperly disposed of in landfills. Due to the increase in the world's population, the indiscriminate use of natural resources generates waste and food supply limitations due to the scarcity of resources, increasing hunger worldwide. The circular economy offers various tools for raising awareness for the recovery of waste, one of the best alternatives to mitigate the excessive consumption of raw materials and reduce waste. The loss and waste of food as a raw material offers bioactive compounds, enzymes, and nutrients that add value to the food cosmetic and pharmaceutical industries. This paper systematically reviewed literature with different food loss and waste by-products as animal feed, cosmetic, and pharmaceutical products that strongly contribute to the paradigm shift to a circular economy. Additionally, this review compiles studies related to the integral recovery of by-products from the processing of fruits, vegetables, tubers, cereals, and legumes from the food industry, with the potential in SARS-CoV-2 disease and bacterial diseases treatment.

Tackling Airborne Virus Threats in the Food Industry: A Proactive Approach.

The current SARS-COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated the dangers that airborne virus (AV) pandemics pose to the health of all workers (particularly in the meat processing industry), the economic health of the food industry, and food security. The impact that the current pandemic has had on the food industry points to the need for a proactive rather than reactive approach towards preventing future AV outbreaks. Such a proactive approach should be based on empirical assessments of current AV food safety practices and the development of more robust practices tailored to the culture and needs of the food industry. Moreover, a proactive approach is necessary in order to better prepare the food industry for future AV outbreaks, protect the health of workers, reduce disparities in AV occupational health risks, and enhance the safety of the food supply chain. The aim of this review is to make the case for a new food safety research paradigm that incorporates the intensive study of airborne viruses under conditions that simulate food industry work environments.

COVID-19 Outbreaks in Correctional Facilities with Work-Release Programs - Idaho, July-November 2020.

As of April 16, 2021, U.S. correctional and detention facilities reported 399,631 cases of COVID-19 in incarcerated persons, resulting in 2,574 deaths (1). During July 14-November 30, 2020, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 382 persons incarcerated in Idaho correctional facilities with work-release programs. Work-release programs (which place incarcerated persons in community businesses) have social and economic benefits, but might put participants at increased risk for bidirectional transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. The Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) operates 13 state-run correctional facilities, including six low-security facilities dedicated to work-release programs. This report describes COVID-19 outbreaks in five IDOC facilities with work-release programs,* provides the mitigation strategies that IDOC implemented, and describes the collaborative public health response. As of November 30, 2020, 382 outbreak-related COVID-19 cases were identified among incarcerated persons in five Idaho correctional facilities with work-release programs; two outbreaks were linked to food processing plants. Mitigation strategies that helped to control outbreaks in IDOC facilities with work-release programs included isolation of persons with COVID-19, identification and quarantine of close contacts, mass testing of incarcerated persons and staff members, and temporary suspension of work-release programs. Implementation of public health recommendations for correctional and detention facilities with work-release programs, including mass testing and identification of high-risk work sites, can help mitigate SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks. Incarcerated persons participating in work-release should be included in COVID-19 vaccination plans.

Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission among Meat Processing Workers in Nebraska, USA, and Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation Measures.

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has severely impacted the meat processing industry in the United States. We sought to detail demographics and outcomes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infections among workers in Nebraska meat processing facilities and determine the effects of initiating universal mask policies and installing physical barriers at 13 meat processing facilities. During April 1-July 31, 2020, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 5,002 Nebraska meat processing workers (attack rate 19%). After initiating both universal masking and physical barrier interventions, 8/13 facilities showed a statistically significant reduction in COVID-19 incidence in <10 days. Characteristics and incidence of confirmed cases aligned with many nationwide trends becoming apparent during this pandemic: specifically, high attack rates among meat processing industry workers, disproportionately high risk of adverse outcomes among ethnic and racial minority groups and men, and effectiveness of using multiple prevention and control interventions to reduce disease transmission.

COVID 19 - Possible interrelations with respiratory comorbidities caused by occupational exposure to various hazardous bioaerosols. Part I. Occurrence, epidemiology and presumed origin of the pandemic.

The occupational bioaerosols containing viruses, bacteria, fungi, microbial toxins and plant or animal particles, may evoke infectious, allergic or immunotoxic diseases which may co-exist as comorbidities with COVID-19 and exacerbate the course of disease. They include hypersensitivity pneumonitis (HP) caused mostly by bacteria, fungi, and particles containing animal proteins, and immunotoxic diseases such as organic dust toxic syndrome (ODTS) and byssinosis, caused mostly by bacterial and fungal toxins. The two most probable scenarios of possible interrelations between these three comorbidities (CM) and COVID-19 are: 1) 'Triggering' - when infection with SARS-CoV-2 triggers severe CM after bioaerosol exposure; 2) 'Reverse triggering' when exposure to bioaerosol exacerbates a symptomless or mild course of COVID-19, and evokes a severe disease. The occupations mostly endangered by COVID-19 as the result of exposure to SARS-CoV-2 bioaerosol, or to other bioaerosols which may exacerbate this disease, include: health care workers, social workers, breeders of fur animals, slaughterhouse workers, workers engaged in the processing and selling of seafood, and probably also agricultural workers, mainly in the developing countries. The authors present a hypothesis for the origin of the present pandemic. It assumes that a mild form of the present SARS-CoV-2 that is supposedly circulating among the Chinese population in the eastern part of the country, mutated under the influence of as yet unknown factor(s) present in the Chinese seafood markets, probably component(s) of bioaerosols, into the virulent and highly contagious form, known as the present SARS-CoV-2, under a scenario similar to that the authors have named 'Reverse triggering'.

Confronting the Upstream Causes of COVID-19 and Other Epidemics to Follow.

The upstream causes of the COVID-19 pandemic have received little attention so far in public health and clinical medicine, as opposed to the downstream effects of mass morbidity and mortality. To resolve this pandemic and to prevent even more severe future pandemics, a focus on upstream causation is essential. Convincing evidence shows that this and every other important viral epidemic emerging in the recent past and predictably into the future comes from the same upstream causes: capitalist agriculture, its destruction of natural habitat, and the industrial production of meat. International and national health organizations have obscured the upstream causes of emerging viral epidemics. These organizations have suffered cutbacks in public funding but have received increased support from international financial institutions and private philanthropies that emphasize the downstream effects rather than upstream causes of infectious diseases. Conflicts of interest also have impacted public health policies. A worldwide shift has begun toward peasant agricultural practices: Research so far has shown that peasant agriculture is safer and more efficient than capitalist industrial agricultural practices. Without such a transformation of agriculture, even more devastating pandemics will result from the same upstream causes.

COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities - 19 States, April 2020.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).